several clinical variables reflecting the degree of stress and distress in various psychiatric and physical disorders. Further analysis of the data on which many reports relating to the dexamethasone suppression test are based may provide support for this hypothesis, but definitive studies would need to be prospective and to compare results of dexamethasone suppression tests with the severity of disease. Many of the variables mentioned above such as loss of weight, degree of affective disturbances, and loss of sleep, would need to be included, in addition to measures of speed of onset, degree of deviation from previous state, perceived importance of the illness, and quantity of tissue damage, for example. 
Philosophical Medical Ethics
Autonomy and the principle of respect for autonomy RAANAN 
GILLON
One part of the moral defence of Dr Arthur was that doctors should not impose their views on parents; rather, their role was to provide good expert advice concerning the various available options and then to support the parents in their decision, whatever that was, provided that the parents were not incompetent to decide and not acting maliciously. Three types of autonomy Autonomy is sometimes subdivided into autonomy of action, autonomy of will, and autonomy of thought.
Autonomy of thought embraces the wide range of intellectual activities that are called "thinking for oneself," including making decisions, believing things, having aesthetic preferences, and making moral assessments. Autonomy of will (or perhaps autonomy of intention) is the freedom to decide to do things on the basis of one's deliberations. Although the idea of "the will" went into a phase of philosophical disrepute, it currently seems to be undergoing some sort of rehabilitation.' For the ordinary man and his doctor there is not much doubt that there is a human capacity corresponding to the idea of willpower (to the idea, for example, that one can decide to do, or not to do, something despite a powerful contrary desire and then act accordingly). Equally, there is little doubt that some people have more of such autonomy of will than others, that it is variable in all of us, and that it may be diminished by among other things, disease and chemical agents.
Autonomy of action-The patient whose voluntary muscles are paralysed by curariforms but who is conscious because his anaesthetist has forgotten the nitrous oxide and who tries in vain to devise a way of stopping the surgeon cutting him is perhaps a paradigm of a person whose autonomy of thought and will are active but whose autonomy of action is temporarily completely absent.
It should be noted that specific actions may be autonomous even though they are not the immediate or direct results of a thought process. One may drive to work perfectly autonomously without thinking what one is doing. One has, however, done so on the basis of reasoning, and one's actions are at any stage responsive to reasoning-one may, for example, suddenly remember the iron and decide to turn back.' Autonomy of thought, of will (or intention), and of action require some basis in reasoning.
Autonomy as a virtue
The philosopher Professor John Benson, in a stimulating paper on autonomy,4 described autonomy as a state of character manifesting reliance on one's own powers in acting, choosing, and forming opinions. Seeing it as a virtue, he suggested, in Aristotelian vein, that it is a mean between, on the one hand, the deficiency of heteronomy in which one is excessively influenced by others (for example, by being credulous, gullible, compliant, passive, submissive, overdependent, or servile) and, on the other hand, the excess of arrogant self sufficiency or even solipsism (various doctrines exhibiting a total concern with self).
I am disinclined to accept that autonomy is a virtue-a villain is surely not rendered in any way virtuous by his autonomy. Rather, autonomy is a prerequisite for all the virtues in that these must, it seems to me, be based on deliberated choice if they are to be virtues. (That I take it is why the concept of virtue has only marginal applications to non-human, non-rational animals.) Whether amalgam of the rational and the non-rational, and it is the will that links these two aspects enabling people to use their reason to produce effects on the non-rational world, including the non-rational aspects of themselves.
There are various objective universal laws recognised by reason (think of mathematics and logic), and among these are a single moral law (which, as we have seen in the article on deontological ethics, Kant believed could be presented in three different ways). Expressed as the famous categorical imperative, it requires us to "act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." His argument in summary is that, as any objective universal moral law must apply to all rational agents, no maxim (principle on which in fact we act) could be consistent with such a law unless the maxim could consistently be willed by the agent to apply to all rational agents.
It is not sufficient, however, merely to act according to such a maxim; it is also necessary to will or choose to do so, for otherwise one is not acting autonomously but being acted on, and it is a necessary feature of rational agency that the agent acts autonomously. It is by both rationally recognising the validity of the moral law and willing or choosing to accept it for ourselves that we can be subject to the universal moral law and yet at the same time also authors of it. Furthermore, because rational agents necessarily have wills they are necessarily ends in themselves, unlike entities that do not have wills and are (at most) mere means to an end. This, argued Kant, is true not only objectively but also subjectively in that rational agents necessarily conceive of themselves as ends in themselves. From the fact that people are ends in themselves and the categorical imperative it follows, argued Kant, that one must always "act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end." Thus for Kant respect for autonomy was both a logically necessary feature of being a rational agent and also required that respect for the autonomy of any individual rational agent could be exercised only within the context of respect for the autonomy of all other rational agents.
MILL S ARGUMENT
Mill also argued for the moral obligation to respect people's autonomy (except when to do so would be harmful to others), supporting this claim, as does R M Hare today,9 "' on the utilitarian grounds that such respect would maximise human welfare." Mill has traditionally been pilloried for trying to square the circle in endorsing both an absolute principle of respect for liberty (by which he clearly means autonomy) and utilitarianism, but the philosoher John Gray puts up a good case for Mill's consistency here. 2 In the first place, Mill's "absolutism" is only apparent, for he builds in the qualification that respect for an individual's autonomy governs absolutely provided that this does not harm others' or deprive others of beneficial acts "which he mav rightfully be compelled to perform."4 In the second place, Mill may be interpreted as arguing that the principle of utility (maximising overall welfare) entails this respect for autonomy, for the welfare to be maximised is -"in the largest sense grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being."4 Given that human happiness (in the broad Aristotelian sense of eudaemonia or flourishing) is constituted to a large extent in the exercise of people's autonomy and that people's autonomous requirements are so very different, indeed unique, it follows that respect for their autonomy will be at any rate a major obligation if the utilitarian objective of maximising welfare is to be achieved.
Bearing in mind the qualifications indicated above it is possible to understand how Mill as a utilitarian was able (arguably hardly less stronglv than Kant) to advocate the principle of respect for autonomy:
"The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control.... That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is selfprotection. That the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over anv member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. " ' In my next article I shall look at some counterarguments to this position.
I thank Dr Michael Lockwood for drawing to my attention the argument of A MacIntyre.
Green College Lectures
Educating the doctor: postgraduate, vocational, and continuing education PHILIP RHODES At graduation the doctor is still a raw recruit. The increase in specialisation of medical practice over the past few decades has made it almost impossible for the student to learn many skills which are needed for practice. The recognition of this inadequacy led to the introduction of the preregistration year in 1953. Specialisation has increased since then, making the educational task more difficult for both the student and teacher. Moreover, the rate of accumulation and obsolescence of knowledge and skills is now so great that it is trite to say that education must continue throughout the whole of professional life.
The problem is how to get each doctor to a state ofcompetence for 
